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Janet Halley and the Art of Status Quo Maintenance 
Lama Abu Odeh1 
 
Over the past few years, Janet Halley emerged as one of the most avid critics of 
campus rape feminist activists, activists who push for the reformulation of 
university investigative rules to shift the burden of proof from the accuser to the 
accused.  Halley contends that Title IX policies, embedded with affirmative 
consent, are not only procedurally unsound, but bad for boys, bad for sex, and 
bad for feminism, charging its agenda with “radical feminism” 
influences.  Halley’s stance on campus rape is consistent with her long-held 
“queer theory” and its anti-feminist deregulatory drive.  In this article, I argue 
that Halley’s “queer theory,” which she developed by polemically critiquing 
Catharine Mackinnon’s work, in an attempt to extol “sex positivism” in legal 
academia with the dignity of “fancy” theory, in effect stands Mackinnon on her 
head. By inverting Mackinnon’s gender/ sex constructions, Halley’s theory fronts 
as an idealist proposition indicting feminism with the invention of sexual injury 
and inspiring women to manipulate innocuous facts into scandalous protest.  
Flipping Mackinnon’s equality approach when it comes to legal rules takes 
Halley to the right of “consent” where Mackinnon had gone to its “left.” By 
mirroring Mackinnon’s critique of “consent,” except from the right, Halley’s 
theorizing echoes a sexual libertarian agenda without/before feminism. It 
defends male sexual entitlement avant liberal feminism.  
Ideologically, such theoretic formulations, along with the bundle of rules they 
advocate for, are designed to keep pressure on ruling liberal feminism from 
departing in its understanding of sex from the “pathology” model whereby all 
men are good except for those who are “pathologically” violent (classical 
liberalism) in the direction of understanding sexual entitlement as part of the 
social construction of maleness. By clamoring from the right of liberal feminism, 
mainstream liberal feminism is kept in check.  
In order to explain the various elements of Halley’s theories on gender/sex and 
expose their underlying pre-feminist “classical liberal” orientation, I position her 
comparatively within the gender/sex theories of the non-liberal academic left: 
Mackinnon (her antagonist), Duncan Kennedy (her ally), and Judith Butler (her 
theoretical homebody). I analyze the way these theorists used the theoretical 
traditions of Marxism, post-modernism, and post-structuralism to posit a 
relationship between gender and sex: sex is gender simpliciter (Mackinnon), 
gender is sex simpliciter (Halley), and the split difference between gender and sex 
(Kennedy). This exercise illuminates the doctrinal approaches of each theory, be 
it to the left or right of consent. I conclude the article with a succinct critique of 
                                                          
1 Lama Abu Odeh, Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. I would like to 
thank my research assistants Jared Allen and Melani Mennella for their 
indispensable help. Their dedicated research, incisive comments, and careful 
reformulation made this text possible. I owe them a great deal. I would like to 
specially thank Melani for offering a beautiful and thoughtful re-articulation of 
my words. Her contribution was invaluable. 
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Halley’s theoretic excursions and argue Halley is guilty of five themes of 
“misrecognition:”  (A) theoretical, oscillating between an antagonism to the very 
idea of sexual injury and proposing a neutral proceduralist approach to 
identifying it; (B) political, targeting radical feminism with her critique while 
smashing liberal feminism on the way; (C) sociological, reading women’s sexual 
injury through the eyes of an “uninjurable” promiscuous gay man advocating a 
radical sexual ideology; (D) ideological, attempting to ally her sexual 
libertarianism with the left when the ideological universe it travels is “classical 
liberalism,” definitively, the left’s most pronounced critic; and (E )historical, 
advocating a “sex positive” agenda in radically sex positivist times.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 As I write this introduction, social media’s #MeToo campaign has 
swept the globe, inviting women to unapologetically own and narrate their 
sexual assault experiences.2  In a script-like sequence, men, célébre or not, 
deny, apologize, and resign, risking lawsuits and prosecution. Women of 
all ages, races, ethnicities, and nationalities have stepped forward to voice 
intimate stories that are all too relatable, and all too common. Each story 
shares a similar narrative structure: admittance of reluctance (“I sat on this 
story for a while”), underlying emotion (“I suffered in isolation”), sense 
of empowerment (“a call to action by other women transformed my 
depression into outward rage”), and a courageous act of defiance (“enough 
is enough”). To anyone watching, the truth of “femaleness,” and feminism 
at large, is proving global. This global stride of empowerment and its viral 
momentum is a reckoning for feminists of my generation. 
  It seems like only yesterday, the various factions of the academic 
left, especially the women of the left who troubled themselves to write 
about feminism, denounced its universalist claims.3 The anti-imperialists 
                                                          
2 Somini Sengupta, The #MeToo Moment: What Happened After Women Broke 
The Silence Everywhere, New York Times (Dec. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/22/us/the-metoo-moment-what-happened-
after-women-broke-the-silence-elsewhere.html; Stephanie Zachareck et. al., The 
Silence Breakers, Time (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-
year-2017-silence-breakers/.  
3 For a definition of “women of the left” see, SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE 
DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST Revolution 37-45 (1970) (outlining 
several subsets of “politicos” which exist between conservative feminism and 
radical feminism: “[t]he politicos of the contemporary women’s movement are 
those women whose primarily loyalty is to the Left. (“The Movement”) rather 
than to the Liberation Movement’s Proper. Like the politicos of the Progressive 
Era, contemporary politicos see feminism as only tangential to “real” radical 
policies, instead of central, directly radical in itself . . . .”), a definition that by 
large holds true till today. 
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decried its universalist claims as “imperialist,”4 the multiculturalists 
decried its universalist claims as “Eurocentric,”5 the anti-racists decried its 
universalist claims as “white”,6 and the post-modernists, attached to their 
localism creed, decried its universalist claims as, expectedly, 
“universalist.”7 
 Notwithstanding the status of feminism, the various factions of the 
left are currently suffering a crisis of confidence. Their erudite claims, 
which brimmed academic journals for decades, have caved under the 
pressures of recent history. Retreat of the Unites States into isolationism 
and the global threat of terrorism has left anti-imperialists with a misplaced 
paranoia. As foreign empires, willingly or unwillingly, withdraw to the 
benefit of regional powers, the long imagined “victims” of anti-imperialist 
literature often revert to unspeakable acts of destruction. The pro-Islam 
multiculturalists find themselves struggling to dissociate from the 
culturalist claims of ISIS, the state that implemented Islamic Law in its 
most “perfect’ form, the multi-culturalists’ dream of anti-Western 
otherness. The anti-racists struggle with the impact of vast economic 
disparity, indiscriminately submerging all races in its wake, begetting a 
Sanders and a Trump in renunciation of the pro-race Clinton. And still, the 
                                                          
4 Deepa Kumar, Imperialist Feminism, 102 Iɴᴛ’ʟ Sᴏᴄɪᴀʟɪꜱᴛ Rᴇᴠ. (2015), 
https://isreview.org/issue/102/imperialist-feminism. 
5 SABA MAHMOOD, POLITICS OF PIETY: THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL AND THE 
FEMINIST SUBJECT, 1-2 (2005).  
6 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race 
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139; Angela Harris, Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN L. REV. 581 (1990). 
7 See generally Karen Engle, Liberal Internationalism, Feminism, and the 
Suppression of the Critique: Contemporary Approaches to the Global Order in 
the United States, 46 HARV. INT’L L. J. 427 (2005).  
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post-modernists struggle to distinguish their brand of critical irrationalism 
and “it’s all political folks” from Trump’s irrationalism and hyper 
politicization of the liberal structure of the state.  
 I previously wrote critiquing the anti-imperialists8 and the multi-
culturalists.9  This paper confronts the post-modernist left,10 as represented 
by the writings on feminism11 by Janet Halley and Duncan Kennedy of 
Harvard Law School.  Both Halley and Kennedy wrote critiquing 
feminism from a “sex positivist” perspective, and both exploit the post-
modernist theories popular amongst their generation of leftist academics. 
Their political positions on feminism differ; Kennedy offers himself as a 
pro-sex ally of feminism and Halley swears to its destruction lock, stock, 
                                                          
8 Lama Abu-Odeh, That Thing You Do: Comment on Joseph Massad’s “Empire 
of Sexuality,” AL-AKHBAR ENGLISH (Mar. 25, 2013) available at 
http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/15350; Lama Abu-Odeh, Holier Than Thou?: 
The Anti-Imperialist Versus the Local Activist, OPEN DEMOCRACY: 50.50 
GENDER, SEXUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (May 04, 2015), available at 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/lama-abu-odeh/holier-than-thou-
antiimperialist-versus-local-activist.  
9 Lama Abu Odeh, Secularism’s Fault, 2 FEMINIST DISSENT 148 (2017); Lama 
Abu Odeh, Book Review of The Impossible State By Wael Hallaq, 46 INT’L. J. 
MIDDLE E. STUD. 216 (2014). 
10 I am referring to the post-modernist left that built a base at HLS graduate 
program under the auspices of Duncan Kennedy and his ex-student, David 
Kennedy. The brilliance of the former and the fundraising and organizational 
skills of the latter combined to create an academic scene, mostly among foreign 
graduate students, that worked at “academizing” the post-modernist strand of 
long dead CLS, while obscuring the other strands. When Janet Halley joined the 
faculty of HLS in 2000, she became synonymous with the scene. Her brand of 
anti-feminism, which she dubbed “Queer Theory” slowly became the official 
line of the scene, displacing the loose alliance with radical feminism, 
represented in Duncan Kennedy’s “Sexy Dressing” article (discussed below). 
Kennedy offered this article to his supervisees in the nineties, including me. 
Halley pushed Kennedy’s difference splitting strategy into a crisis and he 
conceded to her “leadership” of the “girls”- referred to by the Kennedys as 
“Janet’s girls” by sending “feminist” students her way to share in supervision. 
Halley worked quite efficiently by redirecting feminist students’ animus away 
from men and at feminism itself.  Soon enough the feminist became “queer”.  
11 Abu-Odeh, supra note 9. 
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and barrel.12  Nevertheless, they navigate the same critical legal left 
theoretic universe, they share mentees, and they consider themselves 
ideological allies, especially on the issue of Title IX. As I elucidate below, 
Kennedy’s position proves so “fragile” in its articulation of its pro-
feminist ally-ship that it easily collapses into that of Halley’s.  
Title IX13 
 The recent battle Halley waged over HLS’s Title IX policies, 
seems an apropos occasion to take on her writings. Halley’s freshly 
branded, Fairness for All Students14 movement has catapulted her into the 
public square, leading to interviews by the  New York Times15 and 
mainstream liberal media outlet, NPR.16 Halley’s colleague and protégé, 
Professor Jeanne Suk, challenged the “always believe [the victim] credo” 
in  the New Yorker,17 and journalist, Emily Yoffee, followed suit in the 
                                                          
12 John Sutherland, The Ideas Interview: Janet Halley, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 06, 
2006), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/08/gender.academicexperts. 
13 Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681-1688, added 1972 by amendment to the Higher 
Education Act of 1965 (HEA), “No person in the United States shall, on the 
basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be 
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving 
federal finance assistance.” 
14 See Elizabeth Bartholet, Nancy Gertner, Janet Halley, & Jeannie Suk Gersen, 
Fairness For All Students Under Title IX (Aug. 21, 2017) 
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33789434. 
15 Emily Bazelon, The Return of the Sex Wars, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE (Sept. 10, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/13/magazine/the-return-of-the-sex-
wars.html?_r=0. 
16 All Things Considered, Betsy DeVos Launches Reform Effort on Campus 
Sexual Assault Policy, NPR (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/26/553799166/betsy-devos-launches-reform-
effort-on-campus-sexual-assault-policy. 
17 Jeannie Suk Gersen, Shutting Down Conversations About Rape at Harvard 
Law, NEW YORKER (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/argument-sexual-assault-race-harvard-law-school; Jeannie Suk Gersen, 
Besty DeVos, Title IX, and the “Both Sides” Approach to Sexual Assault, NEW 
YORKER (Sept. 08, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/betsy-
devos-title-ix-and-the-both-sides-approach-to-sexual-assault; Jacob Gersen & 
Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 104 CAL. L. R. 881 (2016). 
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Atlantic.18  Joined by libertarians and conservatives, Halley proves to be 
one of the most avid, outspoken opponents of the Obama Administration’s 
Title IX revival.19  Halley was nonplussed, if not outraged, with HLS’s 
feminist student activists who protested the administration to properly 
investigate and adjudicate sexual assault charges on campus.  Reactively, 
Halley circulated two petitions to mobilize HLS faculty in a contentious 
policy debate surrounding sexual harassment and violence.20 In addition 
to Kennedy, nearly thirty faculty members cosigned the petition, mostly 
aging men. Halley appeared incredulous that feminist student activists had 
not acknowledged sex positivism as the victor and that sexual joie de vivre 
was deemed the norm of the day.21 If you were fucked in drunken stupor 
                                                          
18 Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 06, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-uncomfortable-
truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/.; Emily Yoffee, The Question of Race 
in Campus Sexual-Assault Cases, ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-question-of-race-in-
campus-sexual-assault-cases/539361/. 
19 Joe Biden, U.S. Vice President, Address at University of New Hampshire on 
behalf of SHARPP Campaign (Apr. 04, 2011). “We are the first administration 
to make it clear that sexual assault is not just a crime, it can be a violation of a 
woman's civil rights.” Joe Biden’s landmark announcement was followed by the 
Office of Civil Rights’ “Dear Colleague” letter.  The 19-page statement outlined 
the legal foundation of Title IX, which dates back to Alexander v. Yale, 631 F.2d 
178 (2d Cir. 1980) (finding that "academic advancement conditioned upon 
submission to sexual demands constitutes sex discrimination in education”). The 
case marked the first sexual harassment case brought under Title IX. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hKjgHV7GpsM 
20 Matthew Q. Clarida, Law School Profs Condemn New Sexual Harassment 
Policy, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Oct. 15, 2015), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/10/15/law-profs-criticize-new-policy/. 
21 The sex wars, born in the late seventies, stratified two antithetical ideological 
differences of feminism, pitting sexual repression against gender oppression.  
The pornography wars, quite literally, legal wars against pornography, became 
the posterchild for this dual.  Mackinnon exposed the relationship between 
pornography and violence against women, proffering,“[p]ornography [as] a 
systemic practice of exploitation and subordination based on sex that differently 
harms women.  The harm of pornography includes the dehumanization, sexual 
exploitation, forced sex, forced prostitution, physical injury, and social and 
sexual terrorism and inferiority presented as entertainment.”  To many, 
(including Halley) these notions flew in the face of sexual freedom, expression 
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after a long night of fraternity partying, well, you just called it a “bad 
night.” Halley charged the student activists with resuscitating radical 
feminism, a movement she has committed her legal academic career to 
denouncing by vehemently opposing the figure of Catharine Mackinnon.22 
 Confronting young student activists on the subject of rape, assault, 
and violence was a ballsy move for Halley. Campus rape activism found 
sympathetic ears in the Obama Administration, which backed 
compassionate policy with federal financing.23 Sensitive to a liberal 
president, the public and universities embraced stricter procedures and 
broader standards.  Dismantling these institutional mores would require a 
cunning bullishness, a bullishness Halley never lacked. Her 2000 article, 
Sexuality Harassment, shook legal academia and subverted feminist 
constructs. 24 Halley harnessed her testicular capital by calling for the 
deregulation of all sexual harassment in the workplace. She flatly declared 
regulation of sexual harassment bad for queers.25 In the feminist narrative, 
sexual harassment regulation was equated to the commemoration of girls’ 
long struggle in the courts against boy employers’ who demanded quid pro 
                                                          
and positivity.  Though, Mackinnon gained traction in statutory reform against 
pornography, jurisdictional buy in was limited and temporary. See Andrea 
Dworkin, Catharine Mackinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights, A New Day for 
Women’s Equality, 1988. 
22 Bazelon, supra note 15. 
23 Letter from Russlynn Ali, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Dear Colleague on Sexual Violence (Apr. 04, 2011), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.pdf. 
24 JANET HALLEY, Sexuality Harassment, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 80 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, eds. 2002) [hereinafter Sexuality Harassment]. 
25 Id. at 98-99 (“Homosexual panic . . . can be extremely dysphoric. Some 
people might even say that having a homosexual panic experience at work was 
unwelcome and sufficiently severe to alter the conditions of their employment 
and create an abusive working environment. Under Oncale, they can sue for 
that.”). 
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quo, sexual favors, and poisoned the office with demeaning stereotypes 
and sexual innuendo.26  For Halley, these alleged feminist victories were 
procedural hurdles in the path of innocuous gay cruising in the office.27 
Alas, nearly two decades later, Title IX, and affirmative consent, has 
become a perfect platform for Halley to extol her queer theory and bury 
feminism in its totality.28   
                                                          
26 Mackinnon co-counseled Mechelle Vinson in the Supreme Court landmark 
decision recognizing sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII. See Meritor 
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 57-58 (1986) (finding a claim of "hostile 
environment" sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination that is 
actionable under Title VII and the language of Title VII is not limited to 
"economic" or "tangible" discrimination. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission Guidelines fully support the view that sexual harassment leading to 
non-economic injury can violate Title VII). Sexual harassment also manifested 
in quid pro quo claims. See Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1395 (D.C.Cir.1995) 
(finding “[t]he gravamen of a quid pro quo claim is that a tangible job benefit or 
privilege is conditioned on an employee's submission to sexual black-mail and 
that adverse consequences follow from the employee's refusal”); Chamberlin v. 
101 Reality Inc. 915 F.2d at 783 (identifying a “quid pro quo harassment exists 
where a victim's response to unwelcome sexual advances affects “tangible 
aspects of her compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”). 
 
27 Halley, supra note 24, at 98 (“[T]he regulatory project would only make the 
problematic of wantedness more covert…. After all, it’s not just the perverts 
who engage in scenes like those I’ve just affirmed as good who seek incoherent 
experiences in sex: I think most of us experience sex (when it’s not routinized) 
as an alarming mix of desire and fear, delight and disgust, power and surrender, 
surrender and power, attachment and alienation, ecstasy in the root sense of the 
word and enmired embodiedness. Essential elements [of this] are enacted, I 
imagine, in many more sexual relationships than you would guess just by 
looking around the boardroom or seminar room, and the edgy experience of 
unwantedness in sex is probably cherished by more people than are willing to 
say so.”). 
28 Affirmative consent policies, often referred to as Yes Means Yes Laws, differ 
by state and university. As defined by the National Sexual Violence Resource 
Center, “consent is voluntary, mutual and can be drawn at any time. Past consent 
does not mean current or future consent. There is no consent when there is force, 
intimidation or coercion. There is no consent if a person is mentally or 
physically incapacitated or impaired because one cannot understand the fact, 
nature, or extent of the sexual situation.” Sex Without Consent Isn’t Sex. It’s 
Rape, It’s on Us, (last visited Nov. 10, 2018) https://www.itsonus.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/IOU-Consent-Discussion-Guide.pdf. Ironically, Halley 
argues this legal level of consent is a conservative state cooperative.  See Janet 
Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42(1) SIGNS: J. OF WOMEN IN 
CULTURE & SOC’Y 257, 258 (2016) (“the campaign for affirmative consent 
requirements is distinctively rightist and that it would be even more conservative 
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 Halley sharpened her theoretic teeth by repeatedly attacking the 
work of Catharine Mackinnon.29 It was through these attacks that she 
articulated and propagated her queer line.  She misidentified 30 the student 
activist agenda as “Mackinnonite.”31 Invoking Mackinnon was invoking a 
long-term obsession and her project was to offer an alternative theoretic 
arsenal to displace Mackinnon within the ranks of the radical legal left. In 
short, Halley aspires to unseat radical feminism, as articulated by 
Mackinnon, and replace it with “Queer Theory” as the primary source of 
theory on how to understand gender and sex in the legal context.  Her 
doctrinal project focused on the “de-regulation” of feminist injury-based 
rules in the name of sexual pleasure. Halley created a formal oppositional 
                                                          
than it is today if it were not making political compromises to its left with male 
paternalist elites.”). 
29 Halley, supra note 24 at 91-92 (“The MacKinnon brief thus maintains the 
ontological supremacy of the male/female model by simultaneously evacuating 
sexual orientation of any distinct components and flooding it with gender 
understood as male superordination and female subordination. This is, I think, a 
big mistake . . . This formulation causes the brief to argue that the homosexual 
orientation of the “perpetrator” [may be relevant.] Gay rights organizations have 
fought to close this route off ever since circuit courts first opened it, however, 
because it is also a quick and easy route to homophobia . . . .”); see also 
Bazelon, supra note 15. 
30 There is no evidence that campus rape activists were Mackinnonite. While 
they tried to push the “consent standard” to the “affirmative” type, their 
approach is too consent based to be Mackinnonite. Moreover, those activists saw 
Mackinnon’s position on sex as “too prudish”. They were “sex positivist,” 
gender bending feminist activists whose agenda and discourse is unique to their 
generation that synthesizes the old battles within feminism (sex positivist vs. 
feminist) rather than allies itself with either strand. See generally VANESSA 
GRIGORIADUS, BLURRED LINES: RETHINKING SEX, POWER, & CONSENT ON 
CAMPUS (2017). 
31 Bazelon, supra note 15 (“Like Mackinnon, student activists see the law as a 
tool of resistance against oppression, usually though not exclusively perpetrated 
by men…To Halley, it’s strange to hear feminists appealing to men to change 
their behavior while leaving women out of the equation. ‘‘I’m really troubled by 
this trend in which women are helpless and passive and men are the big 
responsible protectors,’’ she said. ‘‘That’s the ideology of the gilded cage. It’s 
astonishing to see feminists reawakening it uncritically. If young people are 
going to have a robust role in creating the conditions they want to live in, 
feminists have to call off this ban…”). 
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relationship between the equality branch of feminism and the sex positivist 
one. She raised the stakes for the libertarians/pleasurists, in the presence 
of the egalitarians/legal sex regulators.32 Halley, unsuccessfully, peddled 
her project in legal academia through footnotes in law review articles. Her 
devotees remain a small circle of foreign graduate students at HLS 
circulating within the scene of the post-modern CLS.33 Until Title IX 
surfaced that is, when Halley became somewhat of a public figure. 
 This article is divided into three sections. Section I exposes 
Halley’s history of obsessive attacks on Mackinnon. I argue that Halley’s 
critique of Mackinnon, in effect, stands Mackinnon on her head. Inverting 
Mackinnon situates Halley to the right of consent. Section II offers a 
comparative exercise of the gender/sex theories of Catharine Mackinnon, 
Judith Butler, Duncan Kennedy, and Janet Halley. I argue that Kennedy 
splits Mackinnon’s theoretical line with liberal feminism on law, while 
aligning himself with post-modernist theories on culture and resistance.  
Halley pushes Kennedy’s difference-splitting with radical feminism into a 
                                                          
32 Halley’s position is formalist because it mimics the conservative argument for 
laissez faire in the economy.. The conservative argument is that market 
regulation aimed at equality curbs the freedom of the employer and prohibits 
entrepreneurship The leftist response to this conservative argument has always 
been a corrective: the comparison is not between the freedom of some 
(entrepreneurs) and the equality of others (workers), but between the freedom of 
both or alternatively the equality of both. Halley’s position is likewise 
conservative and legally formalist.  She proffers that equality-based regulation 
curbs sexual freedom. And of course, the feminist answer to her position is the 
rhetorical question:, “Whose sex should prevail, mine or his? Whose gender 
should prevail, mine or his?”  By attacking feminist regulation Halley argues for 
his sex, whether by design or by default. While Halley in Sexuality Harassment 
does not critique feminist regulation as it affects straight men in their social 
conflict with straight women, instead she posits that feminist regulation 
threatens gay sex, her position on campus rape devolves into a defense of sexual 
liberty in general which opens it up to the critique above. 
33 The once heady scene was a direct result of the David and Duncan Kennedy’s 
strategic recruitment of graduate students. (This is an autobiographical statement 
by the author who was part of the scene.) 
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crisis as she manipulates Butler’s gender indeterminacy into radical 
gender voluntarism. This exercise includes a comparative analysis of the 
ideological positions of each theorist - radical Mackinnon, left liberal 
Kennedy, and radical libertarian Halley. I analyze the baseline theoretical 
traditions of these ideological positions by examining Marxism, post-
modernism, and post-structuralism, as well as their espoused relationships 
between gender and sex: sex is gender simpliciter, gender is sex 
simpliciter, and the split difference between gender and sex. Lastly, I 
compare their respective doctrinal approaches - left of consent and right 
of consent. Through this deconstructed comparison, I assert that solely 
Mackinnon’s social theory, with its pronounced social conflict approach, 
offers a nuanced and transformative rationale worthy of leftist embrace. 
The post-modernist/structuralist approaches of Butler, Kennedy, and 
Halley, in their rejection of social theory, reproduce classical liberalism on 
one hand, and limit the horizon of change in cultural reinterpretation on 
the other. The political consequences of such theoretic pronunciation are 
ambiguous at best and reactionary at worst.  Section III surmises that 
Halley’s approach to Title IX commits a series of misrecognitions: (A) 
theoretical; (B) political; (C) sociological; (D) ideological; and (E) 
historical.  I conclude that it is liberal feminism, not radical feminism, 
which rightfully ascribes the quality of “Governance Feminism” and that 
liberal feminism itself is a compromise formation between the principles 
of equality and liberty at any particular historical conjuncture. The 
#MeToo movement boldly pushes the contemporary compromise 
formation of liberal feminism to the left, with the hopeful result of more 
sexual egalitarianism. Any push to the right of this contemporary 
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formation, as Halley would have it, serves to preserve the status quo, 
which young global activists have raised their fists in revolt against.  
I. An Unrelenting Halley 
 
A. Oh, Catharine! 
 
 For much of her legal academic career, Janet Halley targeted 
Catharine Mackinnon, and did so rather obsessively.34 She read the latter’s 
“texts closely,” as those of her generation trained in the humanities were 
taught to do. 35 She offered a pointed critique of Mackinnon and 
reproduced it in various guises in a range of law review articles.36 As she 
did this, Halley inadvertently renewed Mackinnon’s célèbre. The 
                                                          
34 See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A 
BREAK FROM FEMINISM (2006) [hereinafter Split Decisions]; Sexuality 
Harassment supra note 24.  
35 Split Decisions supra note 34 at 27-105. 
36 Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment in Directions in Sexual Harassment 182, 
191 (“There is a third warning note [to the MacKinnon brief], and it sounds like 
the last gasp of a small yellow bird.”), 192 (“Here is what I think the problem 
with the male-female model emerges for analysis. It is just so complete and so 
settled. Men are over there with masculinity and superordination; women are 
over here with femininity and subordination.”); Janet Halley, Queer Theory By 
Men, 11 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 11 [hereinafter Queer Theory By Men] 
(“It was not too long before MacKinnon significantly departed from [her earlier] 
claims . . . [b]y the mid-1980s she claimed to know many, many things, and to 
know them because women’s point of view had disclosed them to her without 
distortion.”), 18 (cultural feminism and Bersani are engaged in serious combat 
over the value of degradation and human erasure in sex: cultural feminism says 
these have been overvalued because they have been allocated exclusively to 
women; Bersani replies that they have been vastly undervalued through their 
association with women. But Bersani and cultural feminists agree, it seems, that 
the combat is waged on the field of “value”--a field which MacKinnon pushed 
over and beyond the horizon of her understanding.”); Janet Halley, Rape in 
Berlin: Reconsidering the Criminalization of Rape in the International Law of 
Armed Conflict, 9 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 78, 114 (2008) [hereinafter Rape in Berlin] 
(“ . . . [W]hat is women's suffering? What is this thing that should, we all agree, 
be visible? One, admittedly partial, way into that question is to ask, what is rape 
to women who have been raped? American feminists involved themselves in the 
Balkans situation because they thought they knew: the women were silenced and 
needed IHL to help them find their voice as raped women. But not all the 
women they sought to represent recognized themselves in the lens provided by 
American feminist activists.”). 
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sensationalized anti-pornography crusade of the eighties died, their 
protagonists moved on to other causes, retired the fight, or even married.37   
It’s been ages since media and detractors misattributed “all men are 
rapists” and “all sex is rape” to Mackinnon and Andrea Dworkin.38 
Halley’s critiques have been published long after the wave of radical 
feminism. In fact, feminism proper has turned into a non-event in U.S. 
academia.  Reflected in women’s studies departments, the discourse has 
shifted from feminism to gender and sexuality under the heavy influence 
of Butler’s post-structuralist theories, as well as an institutional push for 
watered-down interdisciplinary identity politics.  
   Halley sees Mackinnon’s shadow and influence everywhere, and 
each time she protests vehemently; her cries against Mackinnon’s sex-
repression and radical female emancipation never tire. Halley over-credits 
Mackinnon with every feminist regulatory gesture that touched upon sex, 
even when such regulatory gestures were a serious compromise on 
Mackinnon’s line. Halley targeted Mackinnon in the figure of other 
feminists, seeing them as Mackinnon’s surrogates, even as they  split the 
difference with Mackinnon’s ideas.39 She even went after her, via 
                                                          
37 Bazelon, supra note 15; Eric Hoffman, Feminism, Pornography, and Law, 
133 U. PA. L. REV. 497 (1985); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN 
POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); TAKE BACK THE NIGHT: WOMEN ON 
PORNOGRAPHY (Laura Lederer ed., 1980). 
38 Both Mackinnon and Andrea Dworkin disavowed the statement “all sex is 
rape,” after Playboy Magazine published the misquote in their October 1986 
issue.  The misquote took on a life of its own throughout media and would 
resound for years to come. See Cindy Richards, Fighting a Lie That Just Won’t 
Die, Chicago Tribune (May 30, 1999), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1999-05-30-9906030177-
story.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2018). 
39 Janet Halley, Rape at Rome: Feminist Interventions in the Criminalization of 
Sex-Related Violence in Positive International Criminal Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L. 
L. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Rape at Rome]. 
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Governance Feminism, when American feminist legal theorists entered 
the international arena to criminalize rape and sexual violence at war. 
Indeed, Halley sang every step they make, every breath they 
take…feminists want to universalize feminism!”40 Read Rape at Rome and 
you find a veritable stalker at hand. Read Rape in Berlin and Halley’s 
critique of Mackinnon reaches a stark raving mad pitch!41 All this stalking 
wasn’t simply for the public good, there was a hint or two of something 
personal, an ad hominin flair. Halley was a self-confessed former 
“dominance” feminist before she reimagined sex as a “force for good.”42 
Halley charged dominance feminism with “invaginating”43 institutions 
with their oppressive radical sword, the law!44 Consequently, it must 
inflame Halley that for years Mackinnon has chosen the graceful strategy 
of rebutting personal attacks with silence.  
B. Aping Mackinnon 
 Halley’s thesis on Mackinnon is simple, once you weed through 
                                                          
40 Sung in the tune of Police’s Every Breath You Take from the 1983 album, 
Synchronicity. POLICE, EVERY BREATH YOU TAKE, on SYNCHRONICITY (A&M 
Records 1983). 
41 Halley incredibly proposes that criminalizing rape at war was a bad idea for 
the pragmatic reason that if some men knew they would be prosecuted for rape 
they wouldn’t be available for entering into sexual bargains with their potential 
victims of rape such as sparing the victim rape by many in exchange for regular 
rape by one! See Rape in Berlin, supra note 36, at 116. Equally incredible, she 
proposes in this article the term: “she let the men rape her” infra note 47. 
42 Bazelon, supra note 15. 
43 Rape at Rome, supra note 39, at 4 (“In particular, we recognized the complex 
way in which NG formations invaginate the State with non-state elements and 
their porosity to NGOs aiming to advance specific social interests. GFeminism 
has grown up along with NG, and surely not accidentally, has co-invented its 
most salient features.”). 
44 Rape at Rome, supra note 39, at 5 (They [feminists] seek to wield the 
sovereign's scepter and especially his sword. Criminal law is their preferred 
vehicle for reform and enforcement; and their idea of what to do with criminal 
law is not to manage populations, not to warn and deter, but to end impunity and 
abolish.”), 65 (“[I]ndividual rape charges would drop the Damocles sword of 
IHL enforcement on purely individual wrongs and harms.”). 
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her cryptic prose, peppered with fancy French phrases and gratuitous 
anthropomorphisms common among the literature professional class. A 
digestible way of understanding Halley’s critique is through the lens of 
reaction formation. Sigmund Freud identified reaction formation as one of 
the many psychosomatic responses to external threats and internal anxiety. 
Wikipedia offers a crisp definition: 
Reaction formation is a defensive process in 
which emotions and impulses which are 
anxiety producing or perceived to be 
unacceptable are mastered by exaggeration 
of the directly opposing tendency…Where 
reaction-formation takes place, it is usually 
assumed that the original, rejected impulse 
does not vanish, but persists, unconscious, in 
its original infantile form.45 
 
This is not to insinuate that behind Halley’s unrelenting critical assaults 
on Mackinnon there is an undying love (though that may very well be 
true). Rather, I intimate that Halley’s theories take their cue, piece by 
piece, reacting to Mackinnon’s. Halley’s line might best be articulated, in 
theory and in politics, as an “exaggeration of the directly opposing 
tendency.”  
 Alternatively, one could dissect Halley’s theory aptly by using the 
tenets of Marxism; think of Halley’ conjectures as the perfect idealist 
gesture in which Mackinnon is stood on her head. For Mackinnon, gender 
is one of the social axes that create conflict in society (class being another), 
which women (like the proletariat) need to collectively struggle to 
                                                          
45 Reaction Formation, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Jan. 01, 2018), 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reaction_formation. As it happens, Freud’s 
favorite example of reaction formation is the homosexual who is a homophobe.  
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overturn. Gender is the regime that screws them.46  For Halley, gender, 
and all its manifest injuries, are fictions, “just in women’s heads.”47 
Injuries are an expression of bad-for-sex ideology propped up by 
“Governance Feminism.” Injuries will simply go away if women stop 
inventing them!48 
 Halley attacks the dominance feminist thesis by performing an 
analytical summersault, the goal being to radically undo the (radical and 
partly liberal) feminist association of sex with injury, which has been the 
object of decades of feminist political mobilization. Halley does not seek 
to qualify the association or bring nuance to it, but to dismantle it 
altogether. The feminist proposition has always been that women suffer 
injury. When feminism emerged, it gave women’s injury a name and a 
political foothold to mobilize change. Feminism named the regime it 
sought to change patriarchy/male domination (or “gender discrimination” 
                                                          
46 Its materiality lies in the “sex taken.” Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, 
Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 531 
(1982) [hereinafter Agenda For Theory](“According to the revision, one 
“becomes a woman” – acquires and identifies with the status of eth female – not 
so much physical maturation or inculcation into appropriate role behavior as 
through the experience of sexuality: a complex unity of physicality, 
emotionality, identity and status affirmation. Sex as gender and sex as sexuality 
are this defined in terms of each other, but it is sexuality that determines gender 
and not the other way around. This the central, but never stated of Kate Millets, 
Sexual Politics, 37 resolves the duality in the term “sex” itself: what women 
learn to “have sex” in order to “become woman” – woman as gender comes 
through the experience of, and is a condition for, “having sex”- woman as sexual 
object for man, the use of women’s sexuality by men. Indeed, to the extent 
sexuality is social, women’s sexuality in its use, just as femaleness is its 
alterity.”). 
47 See generally Rape at Rome, supra note 39; Rape in Berlin, supra note 36 at 
113 (Halley postulates rape as an ideology, one that is suspect and 
manufactured, “we might bring some scepticism to feminist representations that 
carry forward the 'worse than death' figuration of rape”). 
48 Split Decisions, supra note 34, at 20-22 (“In some important senses . . . 
feminism rules. Governance feminism. Not only that, it wants to rule. It has a 
will to power. And not only that, it has a will to power—and it has actual power 
. . . .”) (original emphasis). 
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in the liberal version).  Halley’s summersault follows: (1) there is no 
sexual injury in fact; and (2) there is only injury in and according to 
“feminism.” When women complain about sexual injury, they lie, they 
manipulate, and/or they act in bad faith. Therefore, our ontological and 
legal posture towards women must merit radical, unflinching suspicion. In 
Halley’s paranoid vision, women are complaint-happy.49  
 In lieu of patriarchy, or discrimination in the liberal version, there 
is “Feminist Governance.”50 Halley regards this term as an all-
encompassing regime of hegemonic phallic feminists have managed to 
“invaginate” our institutions and minds “with law, their sword.”51 If 
radical feminism complicates the classification of consent by arguing for 
legal regulation to prosecute cases that do not appear to be consensual sex 
on their face, then Halley complicates it reversibly by reinterpreting 
traditional rape as consensual sex. If radical feminism hyperbole cries 
intercourse is rape, Halley counters with rape may very well be 
                                                          
49 Janet Halley, Trading the Megaphone for the Gavel in Title IX Enforcement, 
128 HARV. L. REV. F. 103 (2015). 
50 Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal 
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/sex Work, and Sex Trafficking: Four Studies in 
Contemporary Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 335, 340 
(2006) (“[Governance Feminism] is, I think, an underrecognized but important 
fact of governance more generally in the early twenty-first century. I mean the 
term to refer to the incremental but by now quite noticeable installation of 
feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power. It takes many 
forms, and some parts of feminism participate more effectively than others; 
some are not players at all. Feminists by no means have won everything they 
want--far from it--but neither are they helpless outsiders. Rather, as feminist 
legal activism comes of age, it accedes to a newly mature engagement with 
power.”). While Halley has a good, elegant definition of “Governance 
Feminism,” I find that the concept’s affective life is indistinguishable from the 
conservative “Feminazis”:  the feminist who is happy to use state power “to cut 
your dick”.  
51 See supra note 38. 
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intercourse.52 Insidiously, Halley coined the phrase “she let the men rape 
her.”53  
  In the radical feminist thesis, sex is what men take from women 
thereby subordinating them. Halley antithetically asserts when women 
consciously withhold sex from men, they are not inducing disappointed 
blue balls or adolescent anger, rather women are subordinating men.54 In 
other words, by sheer deprivation, sex is what women take from men, 
forcing an inverse of the male-authored dominate/subordinate 
relationship. According to Halley, rules should not be designed or 
implemented to protect women from “male sexual abuse” (in fact she 
                                                          
52 See supra note 41 for the historical media construction attributing the quote to 
radical feminists Mackinnon and Dworkin. 
53 Rape in Berlin, supra note 36, at 106 (“During the first days of occupation the 
Woman and her first ‘wolf’ had persuaded the widow to let herself be raped by a 
man so violently threatening that he filled everyone with dread.”), n.119 
(Several readers have balked at my locution here: she let herself be raped? Rape 
is coerced, by definition, they say; coercion is inconsistent with permission; no 
one can let herself be raped. But see for yourself if that protocol actually helps 
you to understand the passage in which the widow both suffers coercion and 
decides . . . If you don't have a concept of coerced-but-consented-to rape, you 
can't call this a rape. As we've seen, feminists who seek to eliminate the consent 
defense do so on a theory that the widow's choice was itself coerced and not in 
fact a choice--but the Diary strongly suggests that she, and everyone else 
involved in the decision that she should be raped for the common good, did 
decide. Whether you therefore want to criminalize it as rape-- in particular 
whether you want to give it the same legal treatment as entirely coerced sexual 
contact--is entirely another question.”). 
Ironically, this quote and her inane rationale does not find its way into the New 
York Times article. 
54 Queer Theory By Men, supra note 36, at 36-37 (“ . . . [I]f heterosexual men 
experience women's sexual autonomy as a threat—not only their power to deny 
men something they want very much, but also their ability, in providing it, to 
humiliate, disorient, and abject them—then there is a second tolerated residuum 
of risk to take into account: men's. . . . [W]omen can secure a bargaining 
advantage whenever men want them to produce the effect of bold, indifferent 
female sexual autonomy and are willing to make concessions to get it. On this 
side of the ledger, if Kennedy had filled it in, he would have said that men not 
only come into bargaining with women with a distinct source of bargaining 
disadvantage, but they also seek complex erotic goods, so that they might, over 
the full range of bargains that they make with women, find themselves in 
subordination.”) 
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argues for repealing many of the preexisting ones), rather, women should 
wake from the vicious governance regime of feminism, which implanted 
in them the very concept of injury. In Halley’s line of gender/sex theory, 
injury has zero factual reality. Injury is a mere psycho-manifestation, an 
aging specter of radical dominance. Halley has never seen a sexual injury 
that impressed her - not rape, not gang rape, not even rape in genocidal 
conflict. 
…You see the reaction formation? 
C. Inducing Ambivalence in Others 
 Halley’s theories could also be seen as an ideological descendant 
of a strand of “sex positivism.”55 She attempts to elevate sex positivism 
within legal academia by offering it the tangential resources of queer 
theory.56 In other words, Halley offers sex-positive “liberalism” the 
prestige of fancy theory.  This parallels  Mackinnon offering feminism, 
mired in “discrimination talk,” the prestige of social theory developed by 
Marxist-educated leftist boys.  
 The sex positive position has historically been antagonistic to 
Mackinnon. Sex positive proponents accused her animus theories as “bad 
for sex” and provocatively challenged her in the anti-pornography wars.57 
Those who populated this strand, and in so far as they sought to express 
                                                          
55 See generally LISA DUGGAN & NAN D. HUNTER, SEX WARS: SEXUAL DISSENT 
AND POLITICAL CULTURE (2006) [hereinafter Sex Wars]; CAROL VANCE, 
PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY (1984); 
Janet Halley, The Move to Affirmative Consent, 42(1) SIGNS 257 (2016). 
56 See generally Queer Theory By Men, supra note 36; Split Decisions, supra 
note 34. 
57 Id.; see also Bazelon, supra note 15. 
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their “sex positivism,” had a special affinity with liberal theory. They 
paraded concepts such as women’s “agency,” “consent,” and “contract” to 
counter Mackinnon’s Marxian-like critique of liberal “consent,” which 
was rendered meaningless against the backdrop of gender hierarchy.58  
This camp used liberalism as a platform to campaign for the love of sex 
and decriminalize sexual expression in cases where non-coercive sex was 
concerned.59 By all accounts, sex positivism advocates should rally behind 
Halley in her Title IX deconstruction to promulgate unadulterated sexual 
freedom on campuses nationwide. Sadly, they are absent. 
 By aping Mackinnon through “exaggeration of the directly 
opposing tendency,” Halley induces ambivalence among the sex 
positivists. She does so because she bulldozes in the wake of her theorizing 
even liberal ideas about violence as the limit of consent. Halley wastes a 
ton of ink whitewashing violence against women by framing it as a prude 
female fairy tale or questioning its quantifiable harm. Halley asserts that 
                                                          
58See generally Sex Wars, supra note 55; Queer Theory By Men, supra note 36, 
at 13 (“[] MacKinnonite feminists and cultural feminists began in the early 
1980s to converge on some fairly specific targets of activism--rape and other 
forms of direct violence, pornography, intergenerational sex, sex between social 
unequals (for example, boss/secretary, teacher/student), sex in public-- as 
leverage points for the de-subordination of women.8 They formed important 
alliances with social and religious conservatives morally opposed to these 
practices, and together these allies made significant progress in articulating and 
enforcing legal sanctions against a wide array of sexual relations. This 
simultaneous turn “to the state” and “against sex” broke alliances between 
MacKinnonite and cultural feminists on the one hand and radical, sexual-
liberationist feminists on the other. The result was the “sex wars.” In them, the 
radical, sexual liberationist feminists precipitated abruptly and with great energy 
out of male/female-model and cultural feminism, and, looking back to the 
radical feminist sources from which MacKinnon's early work emerged, formed a 
distinct “sex-positive” feminism specifically in struggle with Late-
MacKinnonite and cultural feminism.”). 
59 Queer Theory by Men supra note 36 at 33 (“[Mackinnon] rigorously 
maintains her stance of not knowing the difference between rape and a good 
fuck.”). 
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violence is open to semiotic interpretation,60 and that, surely, there are 
things worse than violence against women. By defending and qualifying 
violence and coercive sex, Halley negates the liberalism of this camp 
inducing it to silence.61 
The reaction of ambivalence demonstrates that Halley is actually 
aping Mackinnon in the opposite direction on the spectrum. Mackinnon 
herself had historically induced ambivalence in liberal feminists who 
struggled with the particulars of Mackinnon’s legal reform career.  
Liberals grappled with what kind and how much reform was necessary in 
sexual harassment and rape law.  Mackinnon’s posture, that much of 
consent is “coercive,” left many liberals vacillating with doubt. Halley 
inversely does the same. 
 The Mackinnon/Halley duel is as an encounter between two 
positions each articulated in maximalist fashion. For Mackinnon, much of 
consent is deemed coercive, whereas for Halley, much of coercion is 
deemed to be consented to. The absolutist quality of these two adversarial 
positions is a function of the dominant liberal-orientated positions within 
legal feminism. Mackinnon’s radical Marx-like arguments and Halley’s 
                                                          
60 Id. at 44-48. Halley engages in a discussion defining the “completely reversed 
image” of the subordination/domination paradigm, asking: “Can feminism 
acknowledge that women emerge from the court's decision with new bargaining 
power in marriage and a new role as enforcers of marital propriety? And can 
feminism see how costly this “bargaining endowment” might be to women, who 
can tap into it only if they find the sex in question painful and humiliating? Can 
feminism read the case as male subordination and female domination--and still 
as bad for women?” 
61 Even more paradoxically, Halley’s devalidation of women’s non-consensual 
injury claims make her real adversary in fact, liberal feminists, but yet “cross-
eyed-ly” she directs most of her ire at Mackinnon in a classic case of political 
misrecognition.  (cite/support?) No need for cite for this because it is a logical 
argument.  
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unfettered pre-realist libertarianism equally affront this dominant 
feminism.62 By aping Mackinnon, Halley has aped the tragedy of isolation 
within the academic feminism. 
II. Theories on Gender/Sex by the Non-Liberal Academic 
Left 
 In this section, I offer a condensed account of the theories on 
gender/sex that are a hallmark of a generation of non-liberal leftist 
academics. The point of this exercise is to highlight the substantive shifts 
in theory over the past several decades which identify, influence and, too 
often, infect society’s gender/sex paradigms. Mackinnon’s objectivist 
social theory plotted the gender revolution by taking a cue from the 
sociality of gender relations. When Butler’s discourse theory substituted 
discourse for society, the substitution became the consequence of its 
origin; it locked people inside the discourse itself, with individual 
performance as the only means of escape.63 Butler’s formulations of 
individual performance subvert this manufactured discourse and 
dissimilate “being” from “doing.” Alternatively, Kennedy’s subjectivist 
theories substitute culture for society and interpret away the bad stuff. The 
most recent shift in Halley’s line of radical skepticism treats society as the 
sum of individual interactions none of which reflect a larger social 
                                                          
 
 
63 Judith Butler, Performative Acts in Gender Constitution: An Essay on 
Phenomenology and Feminist Theory, 40 THEATRE JOURNAL 519, 527 (1988) 
[hereinafter Performance Acts] (“Gender reality is performative which means, 
quite simply, that it is real only to the extent that it is performed.  It seems fair to 
say that certain kinds of acts are usually interpreted as expressive of a gender 
core or identity, and that these acts either conform to an expected gender identity 
or contest that expectation in some way.”)  
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structure. Her aestheticism module substitutes literary commentary for 
social commentary, and her tainted idealism translates social 
transformations into mere illusions.  These shifts are not just theoretical 
but deeply political. They move the gender/sex pendulum from the 
consequence of social hierarchy to a cultural ruse hindering sexual 
liberation believed to be an invention of anti-sex “feminazis.” The upshot 
of these shifts is the re-direction of animus away from the problem of male 
sexual entitlement to the root cause of “fucking” tied to gender-bending, 
wherein feminism is not the spokesperson for subordinated women, but a 
discourse formation suspect for sex biologism and “anti-sex(i)ness” to 
which women’s animus should be directed.   
 A.  Catharine Mackinnon on Gender/Sex (Marxist-like) 
 According to Mackinnon gender is the result of social conflict. It 
is a byproduct of hegemonic social relations, in which male supremacy 
coercively dictates normative behavior, wherein “no women escapes the 
meaning of being a woman.”64,65 The conflict revolves around 
sex/sexuality, wherein men push for, insist on, and assume the right to 
appropriate women’s sexuality. As “male is the explicit reference to 
human,” they naturally get the better deal.66  Simply, they are on top and 
women are at the bottom.67 This regime is called male domination. “Male 
domination” here is not a reference to specific individuals but to the 
                                                          
64 Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983) [hereinafter Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence] 
65 Id. at 640. 
66 Id. at 643. 
67 Id. at 635-36. 
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system as a whole.68  It develops its stability and strength through the 
eroticization of this domination by both men and women. Through the 
eroticization of domination both men and women, acquire an investment 
in the regime, an investment in the status quo (though far more by men 
than by women).69 
 The conflict around sexuality might be termed the material aspect 
of the conflict, represented by social practices in which women “give” men 
“sex” as their femininity—their woman-ness—requires. Men, in turn, act 
as the entitled recipients of this manipulated “offer,” for it is owed as their 
man-ness is construed. Given that women do not dictate the terms of their 
own “femininity,” extant femininity is completely constructed by the 
regime of male domination.70 Eroticization of this domination might be 
termed its ideological aspect, where the unequal exchange is experienced 
as “sexy.” The “erotic” is not only lived in the mind, but also materially in 
the body; it is somatized. As a result, within the regime of male 
domination, and uniquely so, the material lives ideologically (in 
consciousness) as much as the ideological lives materially (in the body). 
Through consciousness-raising, women, as a social group, begin to 
comprehend, question, and viscerally grip the essence of the regime by 
drawing a connection between their varied experiences, which are 
otherwise experienced as individual, isolated and unique. Women are thus 
empowered as they identify with the collective aspect of their experience.71 
                                                          
68 Id. at 638. 
69 Agenda For Theory supra note 46 at 533; Toward A Feminist Jurisprudence, 
supra note 64, at 650. 
70 Toward A Feminist Jurisprudence, supra note 64, at 638-39. 
71 Agenda For Theory, supra note 46, at 519-20, 535. 
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Feminism is the politics that names the regime, identifies its institutional 
structures, and mobilizes women for the purposes of changing such 
structures. Feminism deploys consciousness–raising as its method to 
identify and describe the nature (the “is”) of social institutions. Feminism, 
in this sense, has a dual condensed role - it names the regime (descriptive) 
in order to change it (transformative).  
 Mackinnon’s “male domination” regime is inherently conflictual. 
As historically established and institutionally enforced, males’ objective 
interests lie in the strength and preservation of the regime which keeps 
them on top.72  Their interests, naturally and directly, clash with the 
objective interests of women, which embody that of the undoing or 
dismantlement of the regime.73 In other words, within domination lies the 
seeds of insubordination.  The system, or regime, is understood to be 
objectively dynamic.   
 This dynamism, understood as a bubbling clash of interests 
underneath a calm surface of stability, acquires a lurch forward, a 
qualitatively different leap or momentum, once the objective interests of 
women are experienced in their consciousness as a collective, (i.e., once 
they are experienced simultaneously and subjectively).  Feminism, hence, 
is the politics expressive of this realization. Feminism, in this theory, 
represents women in a dual sense: it represents women’s situation, i.e., it 
                                                          
72 Karl Marx, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AND OTHER REVOLUTIONARY 
WRITINGS 126 (Bob Blaisdell 2003) (“In early history epochs, we find almost 
everywhere a complete organization of society into various degrees, a manifold 
graduation of social rank.”  
73 Id. at 134. (The proletariat [woman], the lowest stratum of existing society 
cannot stir, cannot raise itself up without the whole of the higher strata forming 
official society being sprung into the air.”) 
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describes it through language, but it also represents women’s objective 
interests, i.e. it speaks for them.  These sets of arguments rely on an idea 
of the truth of gender, the “is” of gender, which the role of feminist theory 
represents. Because gender is understood as an effect of social conflict, 
produced as people enter into social relations with each other, this theory 
understands change as being fundamentally and necessarily social. 
Nothing short of a transformation within social relations, and the 
institutions that embody them, accounts for a qualitative change within 
gender relations. It must be emphasized that law and legal relations are 
one of many such social institutions that can influence, if not force 
ideological and material change. 
 B.  Judith Butler on Gender/Sex (Foucault-like) 
 Butler revisioned gender as the effect of discourse.74 Butler 
offered discourse as an institutional, political, and linguistic 
representational system that produces gender as a genealogical effect.75 
Gender production manifests through an ideational ruse. Here, discourse 
creates and operates through a kind of necessitarian logic that strings along 
sex with gender and sexuality (desire), thus naturalizing and necessitating 
                                                          
74 To expose the foundational categories of sex, gender and desire…requires a 
form of critical inquiry that Foucault, reformulating Nietzsche designates as 
“genealogy.” A genealogical critique refuses to search for the origins of gender, 
the inner truth of female desire, a genuine or authentic sexual identity that 
repression has kept from view; rather genealogy investigates the political stakes 
as an origin and cause the identity categories that are in fact, the effects of 
institutions, practices, discourse, with multiple diffuse points of origin.” Judith 
Butler, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY viii 
(Linda J. Nicholson 1990) [hereinafter GENDER TROUBLE]. 
75 Using a line of necessitarianism, in regard to Butler’s (and Foucault’s) 
discourse ideology allows for a rather simple parallel for essential, determinate 
and fixed categories of social sanction. 
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coherence and continuity between these three elements.76 Once a body is 
hailed “female,” then notions of “woman” and “heterosexual” identity 
prevail as the (dis)course, concealing the indeterminacy of the 
connection.77 Butler names this regime, Compulsory Heterosexuality. It 
also appears in broader literary texts as  Phallogocentricism.78 In so far as 
feminism asserts representation of women, its results are comparable and 
compatible with the regime of Butler’s Compulsory Heterosexuality. 
Feminist theory, as aligned with predisposed binary dominance, or 
performance, should therefore be treated with utmost suspicion.79  
Feminism as theoretical discourse is suspect for three reasons: (1) it 
assumes a “subject” of feminism (woman), and, consequently, naturalizes 
that “subject;” (2) by assuming the subject of  “woman,” it naturalizes the 
paradigm of gender/sex; and (3) by assuming a universal category of  
“woman,” which cuts across cultures and other identity axes, it assumes a 
pre-discursive “woman” who precedes and tramples culture, race, class, 
and other.80  In short, what feminism is denying is that—as 
representational discourse—it is producing the very “woman” it claims to 
                                                          
76 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 74 at 6-7. 
77 Id. at 6-7. 
78 See generally Jacques Derrida, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE (1967) (extending 
logocentrism to phallogocentrism, the privilege of the masculine within the 
construction of a “system of metaphysical oppositions”). 
79 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 74, at 13.  
80 Performative Acts, supra note 63, at 523. (“The discourse of feminism has 
often relied on the category of women as universal presupposition of cultural 
experience, which in its universal status provides false ontological promise of 
eventual political solidarity.  In a culture in which the false universal of  ‘man’ 
has been for the most part predisposed with the coexistence of humanness 
itself…”). 
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represent thereby acting as its own system of power (that regulates, 
prohibits, disciplines, excludes, etc.).81   
 Butler’s Compulsory Heterosexuality is subverted when the 
relations of coherence and continuity connecting sex, gender, and desire 
are exposed as contrived. Breaking from the historical performance of 
heterosexuality emancipates the relationship of sex, gender, and desire, 
allowing the elements to be indeterminate. It should be restated, Butler’s 
grounding tenet is there is no truth of gender, but merely a performance 
of it. Subversion occurs when individuals perform gender differently and 
when they repeat their performances differently. Drag performance is an 
example of such subversion; it shows the theatre and performativity of 
femininity.82 Butler admonishes feminism to drop the idea of representing 
the universal “woman,”83subvert its will to power, and, alternatively, adopt 
a politics premised on temporary alliances expressive of temporary 
identities which dissolve with the identities themselves.84  Accepting 
Butler’s Foucault-like set of gender arguments is accepting a radically 
objectivist theory of the world, a militant ‘wall to wall’ discourse, wherein 
the very “subject” is no more than an ideological ruse of the “object.” 85 
Everything is a discursive effect: sex, gender, desire, the body, the 
presupposition, even the taboo. Whether voluntarily, or not, we are inside 
the ideology tout court, where the “is” always was. In this claustrophobic 
                                                          
81 GENDER TROUBLE, supra note 74, at 141. 
82 Id. at 146. 
83 Id. at 15 (“Is “unity” necessary for effective political action?”), 142-49. 
84 Id. at 16 (“ . . . it will be an open assemblage that permits of multiple 
convergences and divergences without obedience to a normative telos of 
definitional closure.”). 
85 Butler’s Gender Trouble marries Foucault to Freud to Hegel.  A kind of 
theoretical pastiche that is hard to follow and even harder to explain to students.  
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universe of “wall to wall” discourse, the only way “out” is through 
disruption of the very resources of discourse itself.  Within these precepts, 
there is no a real “out,” rather there is only an “in,” which manifests in a 
unique way.  
In further deconstruction, “gender” subversion occurs when 
gender is performed differently, but since the “subject” is dead, it is 
unclear who is actually performing what, and how they are performing 
differently. Who is making the calculations to disrupt and why?  
Moreover, how is performing differently a disruption? Is the norm 
disrupted by a single different performance, or does disruption require 
two? What about ten? Or it is hundred? Is there a cumulative magical 
number of “different performances” after which the discourse on gender 
starts to shift? In this theory, the dynamic of “disruption” divides the actors 
into a dyad of performance and audience. How, in this dyad of 
performance/audience exchange, will social institutions change? It 
appears that having “killed” the subject, this theory resorts to the 
“performative,” to perform the functions of this dead subject. Indeed, the 
performative sounds very much like the individuals of liberalism who 
sway their enraptured audiences to change their minds on gender! This 
theory teeters on suggesting that the “individual” performer changes the 
“social.” 
If there is no way out of “discourse,” if subverting one discourse 
simply means entering into another, then in this theory “emancipation” 
does not exist. Subversion is simply an entry point into an alternative 
system of power. Butler’s “discourse” which emancipates us, is the same 
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one that dominates us! We find ourselves as the Beautiful Soul living on 
the margins in perpetuity, while simultaneously and paradoxically melting 
norms through a single powerful performance. 86   
C.  Duncan Kennedy’s Theory on Gender/Sex: “Sexy 
Dressing:” Splitting the Difference between Liberal 
Feminism and Radical Feminism 
 
 Duncan Kennedy offers a theory of gender/sex from the position 
of a “white middle class man allied with pro-sex feminism.”87 Honorably, 
Kennedy denounces the regime he names as “male sexual abuse” and 
asserts he would like to see less of its ills. Kennedy’s definition of “male 
sexual abuse” is more expansive than the liberal feminist, “sexual 
violence,” but less expansive than Mackinnon’s “male domination.” 
Rather than using social theory or post-structuralist theory, as Mackinnon 
and Butler did respectively, Kennedy deploys legal language, rules, and 
tolerated residuum, coupled with the economic language of wins and 
losses, to describe his gender/sex dyad.88 According to Kennedy, male 
sexual abuse exists in the “tolerated residuum.”89 Simply, tolerated residue 
of abuse is a result of the failure of extant rules to narrowly address abuse 
and a failure of their institutional enforcement. As a radical pro-sex male 
ally, Kennedy asserts that passing more rules and enforcing extant rules 
will decrease male sexual abuse. The thru line of his argument is that the 
                                                          
86 Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of Parody, THE NEW REPUBLIC (1999), 
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/theory/Nussbaum-Butler-Critique-NR-2-
99.pdf. 
87 Duncan Kennedy, Sexual Abuse, Sexy Dressing, and the Eroticization of 
Domination, 26 NEW ENG. L. R. 1309, 1310 (1991-1992). 
88 Id. at 1323-27 (delineating the “cost” to women of insisting on precautions, 
the “burden” of excess enforcement, and the “benefits” to men). 
89 Id. at 1314.  
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less male sexual abuse there is in the world, the more women are free to 
offer sex to men, which is titillating and well-deserved.90 e However, 
Kennedy recognizes that his objective interests as a man would naturally 
lean in the opposite direction, the direction of increasing tolerance for the 
residuum of abuse.91  Stricter rules and stricter enforcement of extant rules 
would, ostensibly, minimize abuse exposing him, as a man, to a larger 
number of “unpleasant” experiences such as being charged unfairly with 
peeping in the Gap store fitting room (women be damned).92  
 Kennedy addresses the “sex” part of the gender/sex dyad as a post-
modern theory on culture, wherein popular culture is treated as an 
interpretational text that he then marries with phenomenological accounts 
of sexual acts. He expounds this cultural ideology through his indulgent 
discourse of “sexy dressing.”  According to the male ally, “sexy dressing” 
is a form of clothing worn to intentionally produce “sexual interest, 
arousal, excitement…”93 He explains unapologetically, from a rather basic 
foundation, “[b]ecause sexy dressing violates the norm for the setting, the 
straight male reaction is complicated.”94  Kennedy proposes that this 
complicated discourse of eroticized fashion does not merely reproduce 
“male sexual abuse” a la radical feminism, but offers women agency in a 
                                                          
90 Id. at 1390 (“I think that men and women might fantasize, play, experiment, 
and innovate more, and perhaps more happily, if there was less . . . danger.”), 
1393 (explaining that “[a]buse screws women up sexually, and that’s bad for 
men,” that it “discourages” women from taking sexual—and pleasurable—
risks).  
91 Id. at 1326. 
92 Id. at 1325. 
93 Id. at 1345. 
94 Id. at 1346. 
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“perverse reversal.”95 The sexy dresser (always women) may be turning 
the power table on the sexed (always men). Kennedy dangerously suggests 
that women, in their voyeur luring fishnets and mini skirt, may be using 
“the master’s tools [to dismantle] the master’s house.”96 
  There is much to note about Duncan Kennedy’s left post-
modernist theory of gender/sex from the position of a feminist ally. 
Understood as left-of-liberalism, Kennedy’s gender/sex scheme can be 
categorized as left-liberal reformist. With his construct of more rules, less 
abuse, plus a “resistance” virtue gleaned from the status quo, it is hard to 
understand in what sense Kennedy is a “radical” (as he self-describes). His 
relationship between ideological orientation and objective interest is 
wholly conflicted. How are we to reconcile his rational objective interests 
as a man, who pushes for more abuse, with his ideological orientation as a 
pro-sex feminist ally campaigning to minimize abuse? Kennedy appears 
to warn us that beneath the ally, lurks a “man.” Kennedy is signaling, 
perhaps, that his “ideological appetite for change” is limited by the 
objective interests of the man.  
 Kennedy asserts that there is no out of “the culture” of male sexual 
abuse, that humanity is born into it and all we can do—as fuckers within 
it—is tinker with its predetermined elements.  We might call this tinkering 
“resistance.”  However, Kennedy fails to clarify how survival within this 
predisposed culture is distinguished from the resistance thereof? It is 
                                                          
95 Id. at 1342-54.  Kennedy notes that “sexy dressing” can be a deviance of the 
norm for non-convention female beauty found in “old women and very large and 
very thin women,” wherein dressing as a provocateur labels them as “rebels, or 
eccentrics or ‘desperate.” 
96 Id. at 1339. 
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unclear how “resistance” actualizes within the regime of abuse. Is it doing 
anything more than validating aroused participants (no shame, no fear, and 
a hard on)?97 Kennedy offers descriptions of “resistance” on the 
“phenomenological level,” exploring resistance via the feelings of 
participants. In Kennedy’s regime of male sexual abuse, resistance appears 
to be a hallmark of permission, permission to be erect with thoughts of 
egregious domination. What exactly is the sum total of shameless hard-
ons accompanied by rape fantasies which will leave a dent on the regime 
of male sexual abuse?  
 Kennedy contrasts abuse with sex; the former is described 
“objectively” through the medium of rules and “wins and losses,” and the 
latter is described “subjectively” through the medium of culture, as 
interpretive text, and through phenomenological descriptions via the 
psychological. Kennedy isolates and relativizes “sex” through interpretive 
text. But is “abuse” not also relativized? Halley claims that abuse is 
subjective, in your head! Moreover, if our relationship to the structure of 
male sexual abuse is mediated by signs that split us into “interpretive 
communities” (“sex/danger/post-modern resisters” coexisting with “sex 
vanilla interpreters” coexisting with “anti-sex feminist interpreters” 
coexisting with “religious ‘total woman’ interpreters”) do we not end up 
with a flat network of “differences,” a multicultural pluralism of 
difference, rather than “resistance” proper?   
 Kennedy’s theory, in virtue, naturalizes gender differences by 
                                                          
97 Id. at 1365. “Coercion, engulfment, compulsion and sexual abuse are 
real…Pleasure and resistance relate to them (it seems) symbiotically, even 
parasitically, rather than a permanent obliteration or replacement of the regime.” 
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creating the always male binary voyeur and the always female sexy 
dresser. He replaces the radical feminist scheme of “men on top/ women 
at the bottom” with “men looking up your skirt/ women wearing skirt.”  
Kennedy produced a hundred pages or so to that effect without the 
slightest conjecture to subvert the male/female roles!98 By creating this 
tight sexual ontology of gender, even if power equally resides in the 
sexing-up “object” and the voyeuristic “subject,” Kennedy draws the 
limits of his own “resistance” project. His all too predictable binary is the 
abiding framework for the proposed political disruption of “male sexual 
abuse.” In sum, what Kennedy’s theorizing of gender/sex offers is not 
social transformation but a movement along a spectrum to the left in the 
direction of minimizing male sexual abuse that is nevertheless threatened 
from within the same theoretical schema he offers to slide back to “the 
objective interests of men,” a relativizing gesture of the resistance scenario 
that turns it from “resistance” to cooptation, and a set ontology of sexual 
interaction in which women seduce and men are seduced. What is uniquely 
missing is an account of Kennedy’s pro sex partner, when male sexual 
abuse penetrates her consciousness as a threatening system, herself sliding 
back to her own “objective” interests as a woman, turning her sexiness into 
animus and gazing back at him firmly asserting: enough is enough. In that 
                                                          
98 The strangeness of this comes from the fact that Kennedy was known among 
his graduate students as a seducer exhibitionist who sat beside his desk 
stretching his feet on it, lifting his crotch up at an angle that very much offered 
his students, the up of “his skirt”, and he did it habitually as if insisting that 
“sex” was indeed a text in this office to be read and thought about by his 
students though never discussed (except through the medium of what he wrote). 
It appears that thinking of himself as an object of a gaze rather than its subject 
was so terrifying to Kennedy that not the lightest attempt at exploring it is made 
in his paper on Sexy Dressing. 
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“enough” there lies the politics of transformation. 
 D. Janet Halley’s Queer Theory on Gender/Sex: Radical Post-
Modernism 
 While Mackinnon aspired to give feminism the dignity of theory, 
Halley aspired to give sex positivism the dignity of theory. Halley’s queer 
theory stands Mackinnon’s radical feminism on its head.99 If for 
Mackinnon sex is gender (gender needs sex to eroticize and consequently 
naturalize gender hierarchy), then for Halley gender is sex (sex needs 
gender hierarchy to happen, to heat things up, we need gender to fuck).100  
For Mackinnon, gender is weighted by the social and glued by the ruse of 
the erotic, whereas for Halley, gender is unbearably light, voluntarily 
adopted, and dropped, its hierarchies are the very stuff of sex.   For 
Mackinnon, male dominance is the culprit behind gender hierarchy, and 
requires feminism to overturn it.101 For Halley, “Governance Feminism” 
is the culprit which implants sexual injury in women’s heads and threatens 
to stabilize gender and overturn the erotic potential of gender play.102 In 
this sense, Halley differs significantly from Butler.  Butler’s “performer” 
struggles on the margins to disrupt the discourse of gender and is only 
successful by “repeating” gender differently as the constraint of the 
                                                          
99 Split Decisions, supra note 34, at 41-58; see generally JANET HALLEY, 
Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 182 
(Catharine MacKinnon & Riva Siegel eds., 2004). 
100 Split Decisions, supra note 34, 165-67. 
101 See generally Agenda For Theory, supra note 46. 
102 Rape at Rome supra note 39 at 3 (“We developed this term [Governance 
Feminism] in part because it captures the strong resemblance of the new, 
muscular non-governmental organization formations adopeted by feminists for 
the prescription of political engagement with law produced by the New 
Governance (NG) school”); See generally Split Decisions supra note 34 
(discussing the implantation of sexual injury). 
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discourse is too overwhelming.  In contrast for Halley, one wears gender 
and takes it off like one wears a condom and takes it off. In fact, in Halley’s 
imaginaire, gender performs the exact same role as the condom. Gender’s 
relationship to sex is one of functionalism. Simply put, according to 
Halley, we are gendered to fuck; we are gendered to heighten our sexual 
pleasure.103  While Halley stands Mackinnon on her head, she destabilizes 
Kennedy’s careful “difference splitting.”104 Halley counters Kennedy’s 
“male sexual abuse” with “sexual subordination of men by women” as an 
alternative frame for dyadic interaction centering on sexual injury. This 
alternative frame effectively pushes Kennedy’s left-of-liberalism theory 
backwards along the spectrum towards classical liberalism. If each sexual 
interaction is unique, and if “male sexual abuse” can be countered by 
“women blue-balling men,” (my words) and if one acknowledges that 
power moves in mysterious ways, unknowable a priori (the Foucaultian 
idea), then one has to weigh everything against everything else.105There is 
                                                          
103 This carnal relationship between gender and sex is a slight modification of 
the conservative religious dynamic.  Halley replaces ‘we are gendered to 
reproduce,’ with ‘we are gendered to fuck.’   Halley is very moralistic, indeed 
almost fundamentalist, about her beliefs. See “Appendix” end of “Queer Theory 
by Men”, supra note 36, in which “sex” is included in almost every paragraph of 
what “queer” means and where gender fashions and refashions itself in the 
service of sex. Halley’s main argument in all Split Decisions is that feminism 
should be broken from so people can fuck. “Fucking” is the primary Good that 
Halley sets out to defend, preserve, and advocate for in her writings and while 
she sets out “decisionally” to look at a particular situation, not biased to one 
“good” over the “other”, her inclination is to defend “fucking” wherever she 
finds and to treat it as a superordinate as value.  
104 Split Decisions supra note 34 at 167-86. 
105 Queer Theory By Men, supra note 36, at 32-33 (“Kennedy insit[s] that some, 
many, men have an interest in reducing the tolerated residuum – not because 
they are good converts to cultural feminist normativity who would sleep better at 
night if they knew all human beings were safer- but because they are erotically 
self-interested heterosexual men who could be more restless at night if women 
knew it was safer to be sexy to them…Eroticization of domination has “taken” 
in the sense that human heterosexual life seems unimaginable without it, 
definitely in the sense that eroticization of domination involves all men, and all 
women in a highly dangerous and oppressive system…the “seamless quality” of 
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no privileged actor, nor privilege acted upon as social theory presumes. 
We are back in effect to classical liberalism’s neutrality approach. 
 Halley’s queer libertarian theory is rooted in the complete 
rejection of social theory as an indulgence in the “copula” that she 
dismisses as a form of “moralism.”106 She replaces the “copula” with the 
principle of radical indeterminate-ness. 107 The nature of indeterminate-
ness leaves Halley impatient with the left’s classic causes such as 
homophobia, misogyny, and racism as they assume too much; they assume 
a society.108 Halley believes each interaction is unique and contains a 
unique traffic of power, the terms of which cannot be determined a priori 
through social theory’s resources. In lieu of social theory, Halley resorts 
to literary and aesthetic language to describe the sex of her “Queer 
                                                          
that system as it is described by the structural feminisms cannot account for the 
“fissures of existence within liberal patriarchy””). 
106 Id. at 23 (“One of the most breathtaking tropes in MacKinnon's structuralist 
rhetoric, as well as in those dark cultural feminisms that take patriarchy as a 
transhistorical truth, is the simple word “and.” Rape and pornography and sexual 
harassment and domestic abuse and prostitution and trafficking in women and 
marriage and makeup and the Boy Scouts--they are all mere instances of the 
structure of male dominance and are basically all alike. Following Judith Butler, 
we could designate this basic trope the copula . . . It is the rhetorical form of 
many of MacKinnon's most breathtaking statements: “Socially, femaleness 
means femininity, which means attractiveness to men, which means sexual 
attractiveness, which means sexual availability on male terms. What defines 
woman as such is what turns men on.” The tendency is, if anything, more 
pronounced in her later work.”). 
107 Id. at 30 (“Recall what that structuralism means in MacKinnon's thought: the 
eroticization of domination precipitates women as women and men as men; it 
produces women as subordinated to men, by definition. In MacKinnon's 
thought, this is not only a social, but also a metaphysical and ontological 
achievement, so that no human consciousness is free of it. Sexuality as women's 
subordination and men's superordination pervades human reality, such that rape 
is merely the paradigmatic form of heterosexual interaction; and it pervades 
human consciousness, such that no one is in a position to say for sure that a 
given act of “voluntary” or “ordinary” heterosexual intercourse (or watercooler 
flirtation) is not precisely homologous to what we call rape. The copula, the 
decision to attribute to the woman who files a complaint the “truth” of all 
women.”). 
108 Split Decisions, supra note 34, at 3-10. 
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Theory.” It is “abject” and full of “shame.” It loves “metaphor and 
catachresis.” Interestingly, her queer sex is not socially lived. It is a 
fictional narrative, ruminated and commentated upon by humanities 
departments of U.S. academia.109 Halley abandons the classical liberal 
ethos of “neutrality and objectivity” for a “consultation with her friends 
on the merits of each situation.” True to the vein of post-modern writings, 
she offers an existentialist theory of decision, decisionism110. Without the 
foundation of the “social,” Halley treats theory as constitutive. She pedals 
theories with “unbearable lightness,” shifting them, switching them, and 
dropping them, each time seemingly reinventing the world anew. In 
Halley’s vision, the world does not constrain theory, theory constrains the 
world.  
III.  The Misrecognitions of Halley’s “Queer” Sex Libertarian 
Project 
A. The Problem of Theoretic Misrecognition 
 Halley’s theoretical framework oscillates between advocacy of a 
neutral structure of wins and losses offered as a response to feminist 
regulation (while pulverizing Robert Hale in the process) and as a partisan 
agenda for dismantling feminist regulation on sex. 111   
                                                          
109 Id. at 151-67. 
110 “We might have to decide without knowing that our understanding of the 
situation is right, without knowing how our decision will play out….” Queer 
Theory, supra note 36, p. 21  
111 Halley invokes Hale quite often in her writings. Hale is famous for 
deconstructing the ideology of the market by showing that “regulation” is 
everywhere in the “free market.” To invoke his analysis in pushing for the 
ideology of “free sex” in which “regulation of sexual injury is pitted as the 
enemy of free sex” is indeed ironic.  The only way Hale can perform the 
theoretic function Halley asks of his work is by turning him from a de-
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B. The Problem of Political Misrecognition 
 Halley targets radical feminism in her critique, but in fact her 
critique jeopardizes the theories, struggles, and victories of most liberal 
feminism. In response to MacKinnon, Halley bulldozes consent on her 
way to the “right” of the political spectrum, disregarding “consent” as a 
liberal sacred cow.  
C. The Problem of Sociological Misrecognition 
 Halley adopts a radical sexual ideology—fucking unto death—
born from an intimate clique of gay men defending the promiscuous sexual 
practices of the public bath in the throes of the AIDS epidemic, an 
unpalatably poor fit for women’s sexual biographies. Halley’s tired 
question: “if gay men can fuck unto death, what’s so bad about rape?”  
D. The Problem of Ideological Misrecognition 
 Halley attempts to ally her sexual ideology with the “left,” but the 
discourse it promotes is premised on voluntarism, individualism, 
nominalism and culturalism, all of which contravene leftist politics and 
merge seamlessly with the neo-liberal creed that we live.  
E. The Problem of Historical Misrecognition 
 Halley promotes a form of sexual libertarianism that is 
indistinguishable in content from the dominant sexual ideology of 
the times. Halley fails to acknowledge our radically sex-positive 
times emboldened by a pop culture saturated with sexual hedonism, 
                                                          
constructor of free market to an advocate of a neutral technology of weighing 
the wins and losses.  Hale was not “neutral” about the ideology of the market.  
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internet pornography, and dating apps. She echoes an aging sex 
preacher oblivious to her young loose and liberated congregation. 
CONCLUSION 
 Buried within Halley’s localism, nominalism, voluntarism, 
aesthetism, decisionism, and functionalism lies a radical sexual libertarian 
maximalist proposition: every form of sexual regulation aimed at gender 
equality threatens to undermine sexual freedom. Halley’s crusade against 
Governance Feminism, cloaked in sex-positivism, lands her to the far right 
of consent.  This is an unadulterated right wing proposition mirrored by 
conservatives who oppose regulation of destructive neo-liberal market 
economies.  
 The rise of campus rape activism, and the #MeToo movement at 
its heels, reveal that there is indeed a governing feminism, but not in the 
fashion Halley posits. Governance Feminism is far from being the radical 
feminism that occupies much of Halley’s obsession. Rather, it is a ruling 
liberal feminism with an organic relationship to ruling liberalism 
empowered by the latter’s network of partisan organizations, activist 
networks, institutional power, and mainstream mass mediated discourses. 
Like all forms of ruling liberalism, ruling liberal feminism is a 
compromise formation that splits the difference between equality (liberal 
feminist regulation) and freedom (the sex positivism of liberal feminism 
which limits regulation). The rise of feminist activism is the rise of young 
women revolting against this institutional compromise; it is an activation 
to push the pendulum to the left towards equality. Young activists 
exhausted by the current terms of [un]equality, “screwing them,” demand 
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reform and demand change. Halley’s fear of sexual repression blinds her 
to the substantive foundation of the nouveau feminist campaign, which is 
one of sexual freedom on women’s terms. When Halley relies on her 
formalist articulation of more is less, she defends the status quo, the static 
contemporary context that triggered activists’ cries of protest.  
 Like many of the historical social movements that preceded, 
controlled revolution often results in an improved, yet imperfect, 
compromise. Feminism is no different. When the wave ebbs, a new 
compromise formation will solidify, improving women’s lives one 
regulation at a time.  And in righteous hope, these regulations might 
actually unite and reconcile equality with freedom. 
